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REFORMING CONFORMING LOAN LIMITS: THE IMPACT
ON THRIFI EARNINGS AND TAXPAYER OUTLAYS
ABSTRACT
In recent yeere, the conforming loan limit hes risenrapidly (62 percent
between 1985 and 1989 versus a 10 percent rise in the price of aconetant—
quelity new house) end has assumed significant importance tohomebuyers and
portfolio lenders.Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac have become the price setters
for conforming FRM5, and the yield being set appears to be 30besis points
below whet it would otherwise be.The lower yield raises the old issue of
overinvestment in housing, but its most important effect is on thriftswho now
earn 30 basis points less on FF31 investments underthe conforming limit end who
have difficulty originating ARMs.Moreover, given other thrift problems,
taxpayers will apparently end up directly funding the interest incomelost
owing to low yields on conforming FRMs.
In this paper we calculate the impact on thrift interest incomeof two
redefinitions of conforming loans:making all refinancings nonconforming and
lowering the loan limit to the loan ceiling for FMA/VA loans(which was, in
fact, the conforming limit prior to 1975) .Eachof these redefinitions makes
sense from a public policy perspective. Thrifts would have earned nearly $700
million more in 1987 had both redefinitions been in place at the start of 1986.
This would have amounted to a 23 percent increase in the industry netoperating
income (income excluding profits of losses from the sale of assets) and a
corresponding increase in return to equity.By the early 1990s, the income
gain from these changes, had they been put in place in early1986, would likely
be over a billion dollars ——certainlya noticeable saving for taxpayers.
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Any loan under $187,600 ía classified as conforming in 1989, and only
conforming loans can be purchased by the Federal National Mortgage Association
(Fannie Mae) and Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) Given a
62 percent rise in the conforming limit since 1985, over 90 percent of all
conventional fixed—rate mortgage originations are eligible for
purchase/securitization by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.And securitize them the
agencies have.Since 1986, half of the dollar volume of eligible fixed—rate
loans have been securitized, up from a twentieth prior to 1982 and a sixth in
1983—84 (Hendershott and shilling, 1989)
Whether a loan is conforming or not haa become significant to homebuyers
and portfolio lenders (as well as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac) because coupon
rates on conforming fixed-rate mortgages (FRM5) have declined by about 30 basis
points relative to those on otherwise comparable nonconforming FRMs (see
Section III below) .Theselower rates appear to be the result of Fannie and
Freddie being able to raise capital market money cheaper than traditional
portfolio lenders can and to package mortgages less expensively than private
sector mortgage securitizers can.In the 1980s, traditional lenders have lost
any cost advantages attributable to tax incentives and deposit rate ceilings;
in fact, they are now paying premium costs owing to the FSLIC crisis.1
Low home mortgage ratea are good for recipients of such rates but are bad
for other households ——forrenters and owners not getting the low rates.A
lower mortgage rate would raise homeownership and the quantity of houaing,
conaumer durablea, and other capital demanded by homeowners (Meltzer, 1974)
The increased demands by the aubsidized homeowners, like the tax subsidy for—2—
homeownership, raise interest rates generally, partially offsetting the
ownership subsidy and resulting in higher required returns and eventually less
rental housing and industrial plant and equipment.Rents will be higher, and
labor productivity and thus wages will be lower.
The subsidized home mortgage rates are also bad for traditional mortgage
portfolio lenders both because interest income is lower and because households
are less likely to choose ARMs that pay lenders a more competitive yield and
provide them with a better asset/liability maturity match.Given the
precarious state of the thrift industry and the FSLIC insurance fund, what is
bad for traditional portfolio lenders is also bad for U.S. taxpayers
generally.2That is, here we have a case where at least some of the costs of
an indirect subsidy are showing up explicitly in budgeting deficits.
The ostensible rationale for below—market mortgage rates is to increase
homeownership opportunities for Americans.However, while moderate income
households may need a subsidy to achieve ownership, upper middle and high
income households do not.Moreover, households who own the house they are
living in by definition do not need an additional subsidy to own the house.
One might think, then, that conforming loans would be defined as loans only for
the purchase of houses and only for houses priced below, say, 80 percent of the
price of houses in a given area demanded by households with the national median
real income.
The actual conforming loan definition does not vary regionally, but it is
indexed to median house prices (Lea, 1987) .Moreimportant from our
perspective, the actual definition is far more inclusive than the optimal one.
In 1987, 85 percent of the FRN dollar volume and over 90 percent of the number
of loans were conforming.That is, the subsidy is received by the vastmajority of homebuyers.Moreover, refinancings below the current loan limit
are defined as conforming loans, i.e., the subsidy is provided to households
who are already homeowners.
The present paper considers two definitional changes that would have
narrowed the subsidy by targeting it more closely to households needing
assistance to achieve homeownership.We compute estimates of how these
redefinitions would have influenced both the dollar volume of conforming loans
originated by saving and loans in eight broad regions of the United States in
1986 and 1987 and the interest earned by holders of the mortgages originated in
those regions.We then go on to examine the likely consequences of these
changes for the FSLIC insurance fund and thus U.S. taxpayers. The two
definitional changes are:a substitution of the FHA/VA loan ceilings in 1986
and 1987 for the actual 1986 and 1987 conforming limits and a blanket
classification of refinancings as nonconforming.The first redefinition is
only illustrative of more reasonable loan limits; the ideal setting of the
general level of the limit and regional variations about it is a complicated
issue beyond the scope of this study.We do note, however, that the conforming
limit equalled the FHA limit prior to 1975.
The paper is divided into five sections and a conclusion.Section I
indicates the eight regions analyzed, lists median house prices, percentages of
loan dollar volume over the conforming limit, and total dollar volume of FRMs
originated in the eight regions, and provides estimates of how the alternative
conforming loan definitions, alone and in combination, would have affected
conforming loan dollar volume in the eight regions.Evidence on the agencies
impact on conforming FRM rates is summarized in Section II, and the effect oflower FAN rates on the interest income of FSLIC-insured thrifts in the eight
regions is reported in Section III.Possible biases in our calculations are
discussed in Section IV, and our conclusions are stated in Section V.
II. Alternative Conforming Loan Definitions and Regional Conforming Loan Volumes
We have divided the United States into eight contiguous regions based
upon the 1987 state proportions of FSLIC—insured—thrift fixed-rate conventional
loan volume that were below the conforming limit (see Figure 1) .These
proportions, which are based on loans financing home purchases (not
refinancings), are from the FNLBB monthly loans-closed aurvey.The high house
price (low conforming loan volume( areas are the coastal regions ——
California—Nevada,the Mid—Atlantic, and the Northeast, where 1987 median house
prices financed by conventional savings—and-loan originated FANs ranged from
$133,000 to $155,000 (see Table 1).Of the other regions, only the Northwest
plus Mountains had a median price above $90,000 ($102,000(
The median price of houses financed by FSLIC—insured—thrift FAN
originations increased rapidly between 1985 and 1987 (see Table A)in the
Northwest (31.6 percent) ,Northeast(34.0) and MidAtlantic (39.4) and
moderately elsewhere (15.5 to 22.0 percent) .However,the national median loan
size for FANs originated by FSLIC-insured thrifts fell slightly because
borrowers in high—priced regions shifted to financing with ARMs.The national
median price of houses financed by both FAN and ARM conventional originations
of all lenders increased by 31.1 percent.
Because the conforming limit rose by a third between 1985 and 1987 when
the average FAN loan size was constant, the proportion of FAN dollar volume
that was conforming increased from 79 to 85 percent nationwide.Regionally,
the increase was greatest in California—Nevada (16 percentage points) and was
also large(8 percentage points) in the Northwest and Mountains and the Western—5—
Upper Midwest.By 1987, over 70 percent of loan dollar volume in the highest
priced California-Nevada area was conforming, and in the noncoastal regions
over 90 percent of this volume was conforming (98 percent in the Western Upper
Midwest) .Table1 also indicates the percentage of loan volume that was less
than 67 percent of the conforming limit.For the country as a whole, this
percentage increased from 50 to 59 between 1985 and 1987.
The last column in Table 1 lists the 1987 average regional FHA limits.
As can be seen, the difference between the highest and lowest limits is $20,000
or only 25 percent of the nationwide mean.This contrasts with a $95,300
difference between the average 1987 house prices financed by conventional FRM
loans in the highest and lowest cost regions, which is 89 percent of the
nationwide mean.3This greater proportionate difference could reflect a larger
variation in regional average real incomes (the coastal areas having the
highest) ,aswell as variation in costs of constant quality houses.
Table 2 contains our estimates of conventional FRNs originated by FSLIC-
insured thrifts in 1986 and 1987.We begin with all conventional loans
originated to finance home purchases (from the Thrift Quarterly Financial
Reports) and scale this down (multiply it) by the fraction of these loans that
was fixed rate (from the monthly survey discussed above) .Tothis we add
refinancings (all presumed to be FRM5) to obtain total FSLIC—insured thrift FRM
originations.4By these estimates, the volume was $200 billion in 1986 and
$150 billion in 1987.The higher number in 1986 was largely the result of 70
percent of originations carrying fixed rates in that year versus only 44
percent in 1987.The shift away from fixed rate financing was especially great
(the FRM share dropped by over 25 percentage points) in California—Nevada, the
Northeast, the Southeast, and the Northwest and Mountains.—6—
Table 3 gives the impact on conforming loan volume of lowering the limit
to the PHA limits.The reduction would have shrunk the conforming loans market
by 49 percent in 1986 and 58 percent in 1987.As a result, the conforming
percentage of dollar loan volume in 1987 would have been 35 rather than the
observed 85.On a regional basis, the decline would have exceeded two—thirds
in California-Nevada, the Northeast, and the Mid—Atlantic, but would have been
less than two—fifths in the two Upper Midwest regions.
Table 4 lists the impact of redefining all refinancings as nonconforming.
In 1986 and 1987, total conforming volume would have been 40 to 45 percent less
than that recorded.Regionally, the largest percentage decline would have
occurred in California—Nevada because that's where refinancings were the
heaviest relative to home—purchase loan volume.With this change, the
conforming share of the FRM market would have declined from 80 to 50 in 1986
and 85 to 45 in 1987.
Table S shows the combined impact of the two redefinitions.As can be
seen, the conforming loan market would have been only one—third (1986) or one—
quarter (1987) its observed size.All regional declines exceed one—half in
both 1986 and 1987, and the percentage decline in California—Nevada would have
exceeded 85 in 1986 and 1987.With these redefinitions, the nonconforming loan
volume would have tripled in 1986 (from 22.2 percent to 73.2 percent) and more
than quintupled in 1987 (from 15.3 percent to 78.9 percent).
II.The Expanded Role of the Agencies and FRM Yields
Coupon rates on conforming fixed—rate mortgages have declined in recent
years relative to those on otherwise comparable nonconforming FRMs.To
illustrate this, we have computed the average effective rates on loans of
increasing size (percent of the conforming loan limit) with similar loan—to—
value ratios (75 to 80 percent) originated in California in the May—June period—7—
of 1978, 1985, 1986 and 1987.california was chosen because it accounts for
roughly a quarter of the dollar value of all conventional FRMs closed in the
U.S.andover half of all jumbo loans (those over the conforming limit). The
data are listed in Table 6 with loan size varying from under 50 percent of the
conforming limit up to over 145 percent.The number of loans in the samples
and the percent of the eligible dollar volume securitized by Fannie and Freddie
are reported at the bottom (see Hendershott and shilling, 1989, for more detail
on the loan samples and the volume securitized)
In general, we would expect the loan rate to decline with loan size
because the costs of originating and servicing loans per dollar of loan
decrease as the loan size increases.This is clearly the case for loans below
the conforming limit in all years except 1985, where the limited number of
observations results in much noise in the averages.Of most interest, though,
is what happens to the loan rate when the loan size increases above the
conforming limit.Prior to 1986, the loan rate is either flat (1978) or still
decreasing (1985) .Butin 1986 and 1987, the loan rate jumps at, or just above
in 1987, the loan limit.That is, rates on loans below the loan limit are
noticeably less than those above the limit.The most likely cause of this is
the expanded activities of Fannie and Freddie; between 1981 and 1986 the
percentage of the dollar volume of loans eligible for agency securitization
that was securitized rose from 4 to over 50, and the agencies became the market
price setters.These activities also likely influence rates on loans just above
the limits because such loans will be conforming within a year (Woodward,
1988) .Thusthe low value for loans 100 to 115 percent of the limit in 1987
maynotbe as anamolous as it first appears.
In our earlier paper, we estimated, separately for 1978 and 1986, the
relationship between rates on loans closed and the loan—to—value ratio, loan
size, the precise month the loan was closed, and dummies for geographic regions—8—
in the state and whether the loan was on a new property, was under the
conforming limit, or was just above the limit.The loan—to—value ratio had the
expected positive effect, the loan size and the new property dummy the expected
negative effects, and the responses of the loan rate to these variables were
remarkably similar in the two years.The loan—limit effects were not similar
in the two years.In 1986, conforming loans had a 30 basis point lower rate
than well-above—the—limit loans had and soon—to—be conforming loans had a 15
basis point lower rate (standard error of only S basis points) -In1978,
however, the point estimate for the conforming loan coefficient was only 3
basis points.
III.Alternative Conforming Loan Definitions and Thrift Interest Income
Owing to the 30 and 15 basis point, respectively, lower yields on
conforming and soon—to—be conforming loans, increases in nonconforming loans at
the expense of both conforming and soon—to—be conforming loans would raise the
interest income of traditional mortgage portfolio investors.To illustrate, if
the loan limit had been constant in 1986, rather than increasing 15 percent
from $115,000 to $133,000, investors' interest income would have altered in two
ways.First, an extra 30 basis points would have been received on 1986 loans
between $115,000 and $133,000.Second, an extra 15 basis points would have
been earned on loans between $133,000 and $153,000 because originators would
have expected these loans to become conforming within the next year under the
previous method of indexation and competition would have forced yields down in
anticipation of the future lower required yield.
The changes in conforming loan volume shown in Tables 3—5 are translated
into changes in FSLIC-insured thrift interest income in Tables 7—9.Each of
the tables contains, for 1986 and 1987 separately, the change in conforming——9—
loan volume, in just—above—the—conforming—limit volume, and in interest income
as a result of replacing conforming loan volume with nonconforming volume.The
change in interest income is computed as
AINC =. OO3OAConformingVolume +.OOlSAJust-Above—LimitVolume.
The data for 1987 are cunimulative.That is, the change in interest income is
based upon greater interest income earned on FRMs originated in both 1986 and
1987.These calculations assume that the originators would have retained the
additional nonconforming loans (or sold them to other thrifts in the same
region) .Thecalculations also assume no expected increase in FHA limits in
either 1986 or 1987.
A general shift to the FHA/VA limits (Table 7) would have saved FSLIC—
insured thrifts $250 million in 1986, $480 million in 1987 and probably over
$600 million in1988.6Of the saving, 37 percent would have accrued to
California—Nevada thrifts, which accounted for 32 percent of total financing.
The smallest saving goes to the Upper Midwest, which originated the fewest
mortgages.Less than 5 percent of the saving in Tables 7—9 is attributable to
loans just above the old limit.
Redefining all refinancing as nonconforming (Table 8) would have
increased FSLIC-insured thrift interest income by $200 million in 1986 and $380
million in 1987.About a third would have been received by thrifts in
California—Nevada; about a tenth each would have accrued to thrifts in the
Mid-Atlantic, the Southeast, the Eastern Upper Midwest and the Lower Midwest.
The overall impact of both changes (Table 9) would have raised interest
income by $350 million in 1986 and $630 million inl987.Again, about a third
of the increase would have gone to California, and a tenth to a seventh to the
MidAtlantic, Southeast, Eastern Upper Midwest and Lower Midwest.An aggregate
estimate for 1988 would be an $800 million gain.IV.Possible Bias in the Estimates
The data in Tables 7—9 ars subject to a number of possible biases.The
thrift income gains from redefining refinancings as nonconforming are certainly
understated.The volume of loans affected is too high because we assumed all
refinancings were FRMs, while some (probably less than 5 percent --see
footnote 4) were ARMs.Further, if loan rates on refinancings had been 30
basis points higher in 1986 and 1987, fewer loans would have been refinanced
and thrifts would have saved 150 to 250 basis points per dollar loan not
refinanced.Also, valuable servicing contracts would not have been terminated.
These savings would swamp the overstatement of savings from classifying some
ARM refinancings as FRMs.
We have ignored any impact of lower FRM yields on the ARM market, and
this results in an underestimate of the impact of a lower conforming limit on
thrift interest income.The agency reduction in FRM yields likely lowered
yields on conforming ARMs also.Thus reducing the loan limit to the Fl-IA limit
——raisingthe yields on FRMs between these limits ——wouldbe expected to
raise yields on ARMs between these limits.
Another questionable assumption in the calculation is that thrifts would
have either held the new nonconforming FRMs they originated or sold them to
other thrifts in the same region.Of course, if the loans had a 30 basis point
higher return, thrifts would have been more likely to hold them.To the extent
these loans would. have been sold to thrifts in other regions, the distribution
of interest income gains among regions would be altered.To the extent that
these loans would have been sold to nonthrift investors ——orthat fewer new
(as opposed to refinancing) loans would have been closed, the total interest
income gain is overstated.—11—
The largest bias probably is due to the assumed 30/15 basis point gain.
Our 1987 data reveal that the broadest redefinition of nonconforming loans
would have increased the nonconforming share of the FRM market from 15 to 79
percent.With a quintupling of this market, private securitizers would expand
and gain economies of scale.In time (probably only a year or two) ,thegain
from the redefinitions per dollar of redefined nonconforming loans would likely
be reduced to, say, 20/10 basis points.That is, in the longer run only two—
thirds of the interest gain might be realized.
On the other hand, the dollar volume of loans benefiting from the higher
interest rate would continue to grow over time as old loans are repaid and new
ones taken out.Even holding the total volume of FRNloansconstant, the
increases in interest income from the narrower redefinition of conforming loans
would probably triple the 1987 estimates.Thus even if the interest savings
per dollar of redefined nonconforming loans are only two—thirds of those
indicated for 1987 in Tables 7—9, the long—run impacts are probably double
those indicated.That is, in three to five years, thrift interest income would
be over a billion dollars greater, on the current asset base, if these
definitional changes had existed prior to 1986.
Table 10 indicates the impact of lower conforming loan limits in 1986 and
1987 on thrift net operating income (income excluding profit or loss on sale of
assets) .Thefirst column contains actual net operating income (NOl) ,andthe
next three columns show the percentage increase under the different
redefinitions of conforming loans.For the total industry, NOl would have been
14 percent higher if refinancings had been nonconforming in 1986 and 1987, 17
percent higher if the FHA/VA limits had applied to conforming loans, and 23
percent if both redefinitions had been in place.These totals overstate the
typical regional impacts, though, because NOl was so negative in the Lower
Midwest region.In fact, excluding the oil patch from the calculation lowers-12—
the percentage increase to just under 10 percent.The typical regional
percentage increase in NOl would have been 10 or 11 percent, although the
increases for the Northeast and Eastern Upper Midwest are slightly smaller and
that for the Northwest plus Mountains is far larger.The latter number is
attributable to a —$222million NOl in Alaska, which sharply reduces the
denominator in the calculation.
V.Conclusion
Prior to 1986, the conforming loan limit was not of major importance to
homebuyers.While rates on loans below the limit were subject to the
discipline of the secondary market, these rates were not systematically lower
than rates on larger loans.Moreover, thrifts probably preferred a higher loan
limit, especially in the early 1980s, because they could then sell a greater
portion of their existing FRM portfolios or at least swap them and use the
agency securities as collateral for borrowing.Also, the agencies provided a
ready market for FRM sales by thrifts who wished to originate FRMs for sale
rather than for portfolio.
In recent years, though, the loan limit has risen rapidly (62 percent
between 1985 and 1989 versus a 10 percent increase in the price of a constant—
quality new house) and has assumed far greater importance.The agencies have
become the price setter for conforming FRMs, and this yield appears to be set
30 basis points below what it would otherwise be.The lower yield raises the
old issue of overinvestment in housing, but its most important effect is on
thrifts who now earn 30 basis points less on FRM investments under the
conforming limit and who have difficulty originating ARMs.Moreover, given
other thrift problems (nonearning assets and a generally high—cost fund raising—13—
network) ,taxpayersare ending up directly funding the interest income lost
owing to low yields on conforming FRMs.That is, the extraordinary increase in
the loan limit is having significant budgetary consequences.
In this paper we consider two redefinitions of conforming loans:making
all refinancings nonconforming and lowering the loan limit to the loan ceiling
for FHA/VA loans (which was, in fact, the conforming limit prior to 1975)
Each of these redefinitions makes sense from a public policy perspective.
Subsidized loan rates can be rationalized as a means of assisting those who
need assistance to achieve homeownership.The current loan limits are
inappropriate because they make subsidized loans available to well over ninety
percent of households and they provide a subsidy to refinancers who remain in
their already owner—occupied dwellings.Of course, an increase in home
mortgage rates would have a temporary negative impact on the homebuilding,
mortgage originating, and home selling industries and thus would likely be
opposed by the homebuilders, the mortgage bankers and the realtors.
The estimated impacts of these conforming—loan redefinitions on thrift
interest income are large because an enormous volume of loans was originated in
1986 and 1987 when home sales were strong and refinancings were commonplace.
Thrifts would have earned $680 million more in 1987 had both redefinitions been
in place at the start of 1986.This would have amounted to a 23 percent
increase in the industry net operating income (income excluding profits of
losses from the sale of assets) and a corresponding increase in return to
equity.By the early l990s, the income gain from these changes, had they been
put in place in early 1986, would likely be over a billion dollars.The
greatest effect of these redefinitions would be on healthy savings and loans
because many of the weakest institutions ——thosein the oil patch most
prominently ——havelargely gotten out of traditional residential lending and
moved into riskier activities.-14-
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Footnotes
For a discussion of this point, see Hendershott (1989) ,Hendershottand Van
Order (1989) ,andLea (1988)
2For an early analysis of the FSLIC problem, see Kane (1985)
only median prices are shown in Table 1.The average price varied regionally
from a low of $73,000 in the Western Upper Midwest to a high of $168,300 in
California/Nevada.The nationwide median was $107,000.
Less than 10 percent of the outstanding stock of home mortgages had
adjustable rates in 1986, and the refinancing incentive of a decline in
interest rates is much stronger for fixed than adjustable rate loans.Thus
over 95 percent of refinancings were likely fixed rate.
The statutory FEffi limits were unchanged between 1980 and 1987, although the
effective limit increased moderately because some areas shifted from lower to
higher regional limits (minimum of $67,500; maximum of $90,000)
6This presumes that all loans originated in a year were originated on the
first day of the year.A more accurate, but also more awkward, statement would
be that 250 million represents the interest saved in years after 1986, ignoring
repayments, owing to the saving on loans originated in 1986.
The $630 million is a gain from lower loan limits.The gain from a zero loan
limit, or the cost to the thrifts of the agencies lowering the FRM rate by 30
basis points, is $900 million (all conforming loan volume in 1986 and 1987
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Effective Loan Rates for California FRMs with Loan—to--Value
Ratios of 75 and 80 Percent by Loan Size, SelectedYearsa
Percent of
Conforming
Loan Limit 1978 1985 1986 1987
0.0—50.0 10.12 11.75 10.65 9.83
50.1—67.0 10.04 11.87 10.53 9.82
67.1—80.0 9.97 11.98 10.51 9.77
80.1—90.0 9.97 11.66 10.40 9.63
90.1—100.0 9.95 12.22 10.36 9.62
100.1—115.0 9.94 11.13 10.62 9.63
115.1—130.0 9.97 11.46 10.65 9.91
130.1—145.0 9.95 11.39 10.68 9.80
Over 145.0 9.94 10.97 10.70 9.83
Number of
Loans 3,590 710 1,157 1,706
Percent of
Dollar Volume
Securitized 4 36 57 52
Source:FHLBB monthly survey
aConventional FRNs closed in California in May—June of each year
Excludes loans originated by mortgage and commercial bankers





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PercentageChange in Thrift Net Operating Income Arising
from Alternative Conforming Loan Definitions, 1987
Percentage Change in Net Operating Income
FHA Limits
All Plus Pl1
Net Operating Ref inancings Ref inancings
Income FHA RegionalNonconformingNonconforming
Region ($inillions) Limits Loans Loans
Northeast 683 6.44 3.66 7.47
Mid—Atlantic 709 8.89 4.80 10.72
Southeast 663 7.39 5.88 10.11
Eastern Upper Midwest 1,401 3.50 321 5.57
Lower Midwest -2,891 -2.04 —1.69 —3.04
Western Upper Midwest 193 5.18 8.29 11.40
California/Nevada 1,926 9.19 7.53 11.01
Northwest & Mountains 96 28.13 25.00 41.67
TOTAL 2,779 17.20 13.57 22.81
TOTAL excuding
Oil Patch 6,280 7.29 5.78 9.63
Source:Federal Home Loan Bank Board
a'Zet operating income excludes profit or loss on sale of foreclosed real
estate, other repossessed property, other real estate held, investment
securities, loans and other assets.
bExcludes Texas, Louisiana, Oklahoma and New Mexico, all of which had negative
NOl ($3,339 million in Texas alone) .Twothirdsof the interest savings is for
the Lower Midwest area assumed to accrue to thrifts outside the oil patch.